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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on this
court to decide this appeal is Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86,
§63-46b-14(1) and §63-46b-16(1)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The appeal presents the following issues,

written in terms

and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.
Issue #1.

Whether the ALJ and the Commission applied the

correct standard of proof on the issue of medical causation.

Did

the ALJ and the Commission require that medical causation be proved
not by a mere preponderance of the evidence but by certainty?
Applicable standard of appellate review:
This question

is reviewable under an abuse of

discretion

standard, that is, whether the agency has abused the discretion
delegated by statute to the agency, §63-46b-16 (4)(h)(i), whether
the agency's action is contrary to agency past or current practice,
§63-46b-16 (4) (h) (iii) and (ii), and whether the agency action is
arbitrary and capricious, §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that if the Legislature has by
statute granted discretion to an agency to interpret and apply
agency

specific

statutory

law and the agency has developed

a

certain experience and expertise in doing so, an appellate court
owes the agency's determinations a certain amount of deference.
But the Industrial Commission's interpretation of the operative
5

provisions of the Workers Compensation Act must be within the
limits

of

reasonableness

and

rationality.

If

the

Industrial

Commission has misconstrued or misapplied the statute or otherwise
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality, the courts
have a duty to correct the error. Utah Code Ann. §63 -46b-16 (4) (d) .
See Tasters v. Department of Employment Security, 819 P.2d

361

(Utah App. 1991), Robinson v. Department of Employment Security,
827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1992), Stokes v. Board of Review, 832
P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992), Willardson v. Utah Industrial Comm.,
856 P.2d 371, 374

(Utah App. 1993) cert, granted, 870 P.2d 957

(Utah 1994), Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 964,966 (Utah
App. 1993) .
Issue #2.

Whether the ALJ and Commission committed error in

determining that Mr. Thompson's evidence as to connections between
the presence of chemicals in the workplace, together with Mr.
Thompson's use of such chemicals in performing his work, and Mr.
Thompson's

seizures, did not

evidence standard.

satisfy the preponderance

of

the

In other words, did the ALJ and the Commission

commit error in holding that Mr. Thompson, in trying to prove the
causal connection between the presence of and use by Mr. Thompson
of chemical agents in the workplace and Mr. Thompson's seizures
(or, in the alternative, between Mr. Thompson's pre-existing brain
trauma, combined with his exposure to and use of chemicals in the

6

workplace, and his seizures) , did not satisfy the preponderance of
the evidence standard?
Applicable standard of appellate review:

same as issue #1

above.
Issue #3 . Whether the ALJ and the Commission committed error
in denying all benefits (even medical expenses) to Mr. Thompson.
In other words, did the ALJ and the Commission commit error in
determining

that even though the medical panel

found that the

medical care afforded Mr. Thompson was reasonable and justified,
Mr. Thompson should still not receive any workers

benefits, even

payment of medical expenses?
Applicable standard of appellate review:

same as issues #1

and #2 above.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative include:
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45, §35-1-77 and §35-1-81.

(Reproduced in

Addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH PAGE REFERENCES TO THE RECORD

("R")

This is an appeal from a final agency decision in a Workers
Compensation case.

The injured worker lost at the agency and

hereby appeals to the Court on the ground the agency abused the
discretion delegated to it by the Legislature
The

facts

material

to

a

consideration

presented are as follows:

7

of

the

questions

In

1993, Mr. Thompson was employed

as an animal

off icer for Davis County. [Rl, R2, R65, R129]

control

His work required

him to use various chemical agents such as a Chlorox spray to clean
and disinfect animal kennels and cages.
solution

containing

properties.

chlorine,

a

[R65,66]

chemical

with

Chlorox is a
known

toxic

[R166]

On June 1, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced a grand mal seizure.
[R66, R129, R162]

He suffered this first seizure during work hours

and while at work, immediately after using a Chlorox spray to clean
and disinfect animal kennels.

[R66, R131]

On July 8, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced a second grand mal
seizure.

[R66, R129]

He suffered this second seizure during work

hours, soon after using a Chlorox spray to clean and disinfect
animal kennels. [R66, R131]
Mr. Thompson had a few instances of head trauma in his youth.
He was involved in boxing in college which on one occasion resulted
in a concussion.
door of a truck.

[R65]
[R65]

A few years later, he

hit his head on the

A year before the seizures he, in the

course of his work for Davis County Animal Control, was charged by
a bull, hit in the chest and knocked to the ground.

[R65]

He had

never suffered a seizure before his first seizure on June 1, 1993.
[R129-132]

Subsequent to the second seizure he experienced on July

8, 1993, he has not suffered any other seizures.

8

Davis County terminated Mr. Thompson's employment on August
11, 1993. [R66]
Mr. Thompson's physicians who treated him for the seizures,
Dr. Dennis Peterson and then Dr. Roberta Hallquist, attributed both
seizures to Mr. Thompson's previous brain trauma plus his exposure
to the chemicals present in Mr. Thompson's workplace and used by
Mr. Thompson in his particular work duties.

[R68, R131, R137,

R153, R154, R164, R180]
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah required Mr. Thompson to
submit

to

an

"independent

medical

examination".

[R17]

The

physician who performed the IME, Dr. Matsuo, of the University of
Utah's Neurology Department, did not visit the workplace or perform
any tests regarding the use of chemicals by Mr. Thompson in the
workplace

and merely

medical records.

talked

to Mr. Thompson and

reviewed

the

The IME concluded his evaluation with cautious

uncertainty:
It is my understanding that the agent Chlorox (sodium
hydrochlorite) is [an] irritant and overexposure would
probably be obvious because of local mucosal irritation
and possibly upper respiratory symptoms.
It does not
appear that Mr. Thompson has suffered either acute or
chronic symptoms suggestive of such toxic exposure... I.
am not sure if we have strong reasons to consider
neurotoxicity of sodium hydroclorite
(Chlorox) as
explanation for the seizures.
(Emphasis added.)

[R68, R166-168]

Due to the difference of medical opinion in this matter, the
ALJ, following a hearing, appointed a medical panel to provide a
9

further opinion on the contested issue of medical causation.

This medical panel

also only talked

reviewed Mr. Thompson's medical records.

[R18-

to Mr. Thompson
[R37-46]

and

The medical

panel did not visit the workplace or perform any tests regarding
the

Mr.

Thompson's

workplace.

The

exposure

medical

to

panel

or
did

use
not

of

chemicals

survey

the

in

the

literature

relating to the use of chlorine cleaning agents in the workplace,
or otherwise examine the possible connections between the presence
and use of chemicals in the workplace and their effect on humans,
as Mr. Thompson had suggested they do. The medical panel concluded
various

factors

contributed

to

the

seizures

but

thought

the

previous remote instances of brain trauma were more likely the
"culprit" than the exposure to chemicals in the workplace which
immediately preceded the seizures:
Our conclusion on this is based on an effort to
balance various factors that may reasonably be considered
as contributory to the occurrence of isolated grand mal
seizures. On the one hand, we have the suggestion that
one or more of the chemical substances he was exposed to
triggered the seizures. It seems quite unlikely that the
exposure to the Chlorox solution reached sufficient
levels to cause any impact on his cerebral function since
there does not appear to have been any of the observed
prodromes of significant respiratory distress which
ordinarily accompanied even slight exposures to any
Chlorox type spray.
There is secondly, a significant
delay in the occurrence after the last exposure, during
which he was apparently able to function well, suggesting
there was no acute involvement.
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On the other hand, we have a history of a number of
other factors which must be considered. The decreased
smell function is most commonly an effect of an injury
which ruptures the olfactory fibers coming down through
the lamina cribrosa beneath the frontal lobes. Although
we do not know of a specific injury, this can occur
without loss of consciousness or otherwise affect the
person in other than loss of olfactory function,
especially early in life. Secondly, there is a history
of an abnormal ventricle consistent with an injury back
in 1988. There is a localized EEG abnormality recorded,
which is not likely the result of a diffuse general toxic
agent.
There are additional historic events to consider,
including the "concussion" in the boxing match when he
was in college, sufficient to require emergency room
care, and according to his mother, a period when he
missed enough school to delay his education. Secondly is
the event when he hit his head on the door frame of the
vehicle, which was considered sufficient to secure a CT
scan at the time.
Lastly, there is the slightly low
blood sugar noted on arrival at the doctor's office, but
this in itself would not have occurred from exposure to
the chemicals under consideration.
There is a longstanding evidence of asymmetry of the lateral ventricles.
Thus, it appears to the panel in terms of reasonable
medical probability these other multiple evidences of
impact on the brain were more likely the causative factor
than what would have to be an extremely atypical manner
of chemical effect on the brain. [R43-44]

Significantly, the medical panel did not address the issue of
the effect
exposure

of historic

to toxic

brain

agents

trauma events

in the workplace

building upon one another.

11

and

the

acting

immediate

together

or

The medical panel was giving us their best guess.

But it

remains a guess.
The ALJ determined that "counsel for the applicant has done a
commendable job in providing a thorough analysis as to why this
case should be decided in favor of the applicant.

However, medical

causation is lacking, and the weight of medical opinion is contrary
to a finding of medical causation."

(Emphasis added.)

[R69]

By "weight", the ALJ apparently meant the medical panel report
because the two treating physicians believed the exposure to the
chemicals in the workplace was clearly the most likely causative
agent and the IME was equivocal and uncertain.

The ALJ placed much

more faith in the medical panel's report than it warranted.
Mr. Thompson filed a lengthy Motion for Review for review by
the Industrial Commission.
Industrial

Commission

[R73-92]

affirmed

On December 2, 1994, the

the ALJ's

decision

opinion without elaboration or meaningful analysis.

in a

brief

[R93-96]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge erred in three critical respects
relating to burden of proof, and such errors require a reversal of
the ALJ's Order.

The Industrial Commission did not thoroughly

analyze Mr. Thompson's arguments in his Motion for Review and by
its decision denying his Motion for Review compounded the ALJ's
errors.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
12

Issue #1.

The ALJ committed error in requiring certainty in

medical causation.
This is a difficult case, factually and legally.
Factually, this case is difficult because the injury is by its
very nature, quite mysterious. We are dealing with seizures, which
are non-traumatic, totally brain-centered events.

There were no

eyewitnesses to the seizures other than the person who had the
seizures, and that person was not conscious during the seizures and
can't tell us a lot about what happened immediately prior to or
during the seizures.

It is no wonder that identifying the cause or

causes of the injury is difficult.
caused the seizures.

Everyone is guessing at what

Several factors, acting cumulatively or in

combination, may have caused the seizures. The obvious way to test
hypotheses as to causation, namely to replicate the conditions,
might seriously injure or kill Mr. Thompson and is thus out of the
question.
Legally, this case is difficult because it raises serious
questions about the whole concept of causation and the quantum of
proof necessary to establish medical causation in cases involving
non-traumatic, brain events such as seizures.
A.

The ALJ Decision and the Board Affirmance

The Administrative Law Judge determined that the proof Mr.
Thompson submitted was simply "insufficient" to establish a medical

13

connection between Mr. Thompson's work for Davis County Animal
Control and his grand mal seizures.

[R70]

Mr. Thompson's Motion for Review argued the ALJ had required
Mr. Thompson to prove causation in this unique kind of case to a
high level of probability or even certainty, thereby applying a
too-stringent standard of proof to Mr. Thompson's case.
decision, the Commission
Commission's

review

applied

correct

the

of

In its

ruled, without any analysis, that "the
the ALJ's

standard

decision

of

proof,

evidence, to Mr. Thompson's claim."
This is an incorrect conclusion.

shows

that

preponderance

the ALJ
of

the

[R94]
The ALJ erroneously assumed

that the question of medical causation needed to be answered in
absolute terms.
discretion.

This was an incorrect assumption and an abuse of

The law is otherwise.

Causation need not be absolute,

but may be relative based on natural and reasonable inferences, if
the basic facts in the record and common human experience will
support such natural and reasonable inferences.

B.

Operative Statute, Regulation and Relevant Case Law

Professor Larson, in his treatise,

The Law of Workmen's

Compensation, §41.32, 41.33(a), recognized this very problem of
causation in non-traumatic brain dysfunction cases, and in his
work, speaking in the context of occupational diseases, states:

14

If the employment is attended with unusual germs,
poisons, chemicals, fumes, dusts, spores, or similar
conditions, the problem of satisfying the distinction
[between diseases that are neither accidental nor
occupational, but common to mankind and not distinctively
associated with employment, and occupational diseases] is
not serious. Controverted . . . cases will usually be
found to involve, not the definition, but a problem of
proof: the question whether these employment conditions
in fact produced the disability.
Larson's solution is set forth in § 38.83(e):
Although medical evidence in a particular case may be
uncertain or deficient, this will not necessarily bar an award if
it is the type of case in which the exertion, taken with other
facts, 'raises a natural inference through human experience' of
causal contribution.
(Emphasis added.)
This case

is the

"type of case" in which Mr. Thompson's

exposure to known irritants in the workplace immediately prior to
his two seizures (which occurred during work hours, and which have
never occurred before or after), either alone or together with Mr.
Thompson's pre-existing brain condition, does

"raise a natural

inference through human experience" of a causal connection between
his work and his injury.
While something more than a mere logical relationship between
the employment and the injury or disease must be shown, Glasrock
Home Health Care v. Leiva, 578 So.2d 776

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1991), causation need not be established with absolute certainty.
See Jackson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn.
1987) :

15

. . . [M] edical proof that the injury was caused in the
course of the employee's work must not be speculative or
so uncertain regarding the cause of the injury that
attributing it to the plaintiff's employment would be an
arbitrary determination or a mere possibility....
If,
however, equivocal medical evidence combined with other
evidence supports a finding of causation, such an
inference may, nevertheless, be drawn by the trial court
under the case law...
(Emphasis added.)
See also Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc.f 803 S.W.2d 672, 676-77
(Tenn. 1991):
It is entirely appropriate for a trial judge to predicate
an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given
incident 'could be' the cause of the plaintiff's injury,
when he also has before him lay testimony from which it
may reasonably be inferred that the incident was in fact
the cause of the injury.
Viewing the medical proof ['It seems reasonable that
the physicians having greater contact with the Plaintiff
would have the advantage and opportunity to provide a
more in-depth opinion, if not a more accurate one.'] in
combination with the lay testimony ['of the employee and
her husband'], we are persuaded that there exists a
rational connection between the plaintiff's physical
condition and the incident that occurred on September 27,
1985, at the employer's warehouse.
We find that the
injury arose out of and occurred in the course and scope
of the plaintiff's employment.
We reiterate the rule
that causation need not be established with utmost
certainty.
(Emphasis added.)
See also Florida Power Corporation v. Stenholm, 577 So.2d 977, 98283 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1991):
[E]vidence of causation must be shown by something more
than it is merely logical that the injury arose out of
the claimant's employment, [t]his is not to say that
causal relationship requires absolute proof to the
exclusion of reasonable inferences.
16

•

*

•

[I]n Meehan v. Crowder, the Supreme Court rejected the
employer/carrier's contention that causation in that case was
based on conjecture, noting that: ' [c]onjecture may be said
to be supposition without a premise of fact.'
[I]n Meehan,
the Supreme Court found that the compensation award rested
upon an inference of liability which was sustained by the
premise of facts to be found, i.e., that the claimant was well
immediately preceding the [exposure] and was sick soon after.
The court concluded that ' [t]he evidence show[ed] a natural
sequence of events based on facts from which liability can be
inferred.' Id.
Similarly, in Lake v. Irwin Yacht and Marine, the
claimant's condition of bronchitis was found to be
compensable even though the medical test did not
establish the cause of the bronchitis. Rather, causal
connection between [the bronchitis] and the employment
was found to be shown by the medical testimony to the
effect that the claimant's chemical exposure was the most
likely cause of the bronchitis based on the claimant's
history and the fact that she completely recovered after
permanently leaving the employ of Irwin Yacht.

[T]his court in Wiley held that the reasonable inference
of liability therein was supported by the premise of
facts to be found, i.e., that the claimant was free of
pulmonary
difficulties
prior
to her exposure....
Additionally, her condition improved when she worked for
other employers and worsened after she returned to the
[former employer's] work environment. Thus, the claimant
was exposed to a product which was capable of producing
the type of illness which she subsequently developed and
the record indicated the existence of 'a natural sequence
of events based on facts from which liability can be
inferred.'
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the evidence showed a natural sequence of
events

based

inferred.

on

facts

from

which

liability

should

have

been

The ALJ should have let the natural and reasonable
17

inferences

from

the

basic

facts

lead

him

to

a

more

correct

decision.
The case of Peck v. Procter & Gamble, 586 So.2d 714, 717 (La.
App. 1991), is similar to the instant case in several respects.

In

Peek, the plaintiff/employee had several nonwork factors present
(such as smoking) . He also worked in a setting where he had direct
contact with detergents on a daily basis and, at various times
during his employment, he was exposed to enzymes used in making
some

of

the

detergents.

The

plaintiff

problems and even on one occasion fainted.

developed

respiratory

Plaintiff's physician

initially opined that plaintiff had restrictive pulmonary disease
which could well be related to his long standing history of dust
exposure.

After further examination, plaintiff's physician then

attributed the pulmonary problems to the fact that he was a chronic
smoker.

The Defendant's physician evaluated the worker's medical

history, examined the worker once and opined that the worker's
respiratory

problems

were

most

probably

overweight and his chronic smoking habit.

caused

by

his

being

Another physician, at

defendant's request, also evaluated the worker's medical history
and he too related the worker's condition to his smoking.
The trial court found that the plaintiff had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was a causal relationship
between his employment and the condition.

18

The defendant attacked the trial court's decision on grounds
of inadequate proof of causation, but the appellate court affirmed:
The trial court was clearly impressed with plaintiff's
testimony regarding the nature of his condition and with
the testimony indicating that plaintiff's health improved
when he was no longer around the enzyme dust.
[T] he plaintiff does not have to prove causal connection
to an absolute certainty.
It is sufficient that
plaintiff establish the cause of his disability by a
reasonable probability.
Given this standard of probability, not certainty, the Appellate
Court

ruled

that

the

totality

of

the evidence, both

lay

and

medical, provided a reasonable factual basis for its findings.
Thus, in looking at the issue of causation, it is entirely
appropriate to consider, in addition to expert medical testimony
(invariably from both sides), any factual circumstances which bear
on the question of causation, such as the presence or absence of
nonwork-related components (which may or may not have contributed
to the development of the affliction) , the nature and extent of the
employee's exposure while employed during work hours or at the
workplace and the correlations between the claimant's work history
and the development of the affliction, such as whether he had the
problem prior to his entry into the workplace and whether the
problem continued after he left the workplace.
It is entirely appropriate to draw any and all "natural" or
"reasonable" inferences from the facts.
Co., 339 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. App. 1986).
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See Gay v. J. P. Stevens

C.

Application to this Case and Discussion

In this case, the ALJ adopted an artificially high and too
rigid view of causation.
Because of that, he did not attempt to consider the reasonable
inferences which could be drawn from the undisputed

facts and

instead got tangled up in what the IME physician and medical panel
assumed

didn't

concentrating
causation

was

happen

on what

(no

respiratory

did happen.

"lacking"

but

the

distress)

The ALJ
ALJ

did

instead

concluded

not

give

of

medical

sufficient

consideration to the basic facts of when and where the seizures
occurred and when and where they did not occur, and did not allow
himself to consider the natural and reasonable inferences which
could be drawn from those basic facts.
Had

the ALJ

come to the

case with the

less rigid,

more

flexible standard of causation which should be applied in nontraumatic
reasonable

injury cases, he would have drawn those natural
inferences

and

found

that

the

facts

supported

and
a

conclusion consistent with recovery.
In this case, this issue of cause is a mystery, and it is
normal to look for clues to solve the mystery.

There are, without

question, a number of factors which exist in the case - no sense of
smell, the boxing incident, the slight concussion in 1988, the
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localized EEG abnormality.

But what about the causative factors in

the workplace?
All

of

existence

as

the
of

above
1988

listed
and

nonwork-related

1989.

Yet

at

factors were

no

time, under

in
any

circumstances, until the summer of 1993, did Mr. Thompson suffer a
seizure, and he has not suffered any seizure since leaving the
workplace. And he suffered not one but two seizures, in relatively
short order, both during work hours, both immediately or soon after
cleaning the animal kennels with a degreaser and a Chlorox spray.
Mr. Thompson's employment did involve exposure to Chlorox and
other chemicals.
Chlorox (chlorine) is a known irritant and dangerous chemical.
See, for example, Pittsburgh Bd of Education v. Worker's Comp.
Appeal Bd, 529 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 1987).
In

this

case,

there

is no

dispute

that

Ivan

Thompson's

seizures occurred during work hours and soon after he had been
exposed to chemicals with known toxic characteristics in the form
of an aerosol spray used by him.
This gets him started.
Compensation Law, §38.83(m):

See

Larson's

Law

of

Workmen's

[T]here is something about the occurrence of an injury
within the time and space boundaries of employment that
gives a substantial head start towards compensability.
On both occasions, when Mr. Thompson did suffer the seizures, it
was during work hours, immediately following his work duty of
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cleaning

the portable

solution

and

kennels, spraying

exposure

to

other

them with the

animal

cleaning

Chlorox

and

treating

any

previous

chemicals in the workplace.
Mr.

Thompson's

seizures

never

occurred

in

workplace or at home or at night or on weekends--they occurred
during

the day, while he was working

for Davis County Animal

Control and where he had been using a Chlorox spray and been around
other chemicals and just after he left the workplace.

The seizures

happened not once, but twice, in virtually the same sequence and
pattern.
Mr. Thompson's treating physicians, first his family doctor,
Dr. Peterson, and then his treating specialist, Dr. Hallquist,
believed that Mr. Thompson's exposure to the chlorine agent was the
most likely cause of the seizures.
The

seizures

have

not

[R180]

occurred

since

July

8,

1993.

Admittedly, Mr. Thompson did not return to the workplace after July
8, 1993, and under doctor's orders has carefully avoided exposure
to Chlorox, and he has been taking antiseizure medication, etc.-but the fact is, he has been seizure-free since being away from the
workplace.
Interestingly,

the

IME

doctor,

Dr.

Matsuo,

was

totally

uncertain as to causation and the medical panel virtually admitted
it was really just guessing as to reasonable proababilities.
both

agreed

that

Mr.

Thompson

should
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keep

himself

away

Yet
from

chemical fumes.

Why should he do that if exposure to such fumes

was not a likely causative factor?
In this case, the ALJ ignored these natural and reasonable
inferences and instead emphasized what presumably didn't happen
during the seizures.

For example, the ALJ placed some emphasis on

the IME and medical panel's "finding" that Mr. Thompson experienced
no acute breathing problems prior to the seizures.

Whether Mr.

Thompson experienced respiratory problems prior to the seizures is
a total unknown - (the IME and the medical panel assume he did not
but

this

is entirely

an assumption) .

But

the point

is this

isolated factor should not be given the critical "weight" the ALJ
gave this particular "clue."
Mr.

Thompson

happened

to

Likewise, whether what happened to

anybody

seizures) is also not dispositive.
idiosyncratic event.

else

(whether

coworkers

had

A seizure is an extremely

See Herrera v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 550 P. 2d

144, 146.
In this case, questions still exist as to causation.
always exist.
these

strange

They may

To determine with greater finality the cause of
injuries would

himself to dangerous testing.

require

Mr. Thompson

to

subject

See Herrera v. Flour Utah, Inc., 550

P.2d 144 (N.M. App. 1976) at 147:
There was, of course, one way to conclusively determine
the cause of the plaintiff's allergy--to expose him to
more of the same paint.
[The doctors] agreed that the
serious dangers to the plaintiff which could result from
such a test were not justified by the benefits of knowing
23

with absolute certainty the cause of the plaintiff's
reactions. The law should not require measures which the
medical experts decline to take for fear of endangering
an individual's health.
(Emphasis added.)
The ALJ

faced a difficult

call

in this case because

the

central issue of causation involves guesswork, but he should have
made reasonable inferences from the fundamental facts as to the
similar space and time characteristics of the seizures and the
strikingly

similar etiology of both seizures.

He should have

required less than absolute certainty in medical causation.
Had he done

so, he would and should have concluded

that

factors related to the workplace were the predominant causative
factor.

He could and should have found a rational

between the workplace and the seizures.

connection

He should have come down

on the side of allowing benefits rather than denying them.

See,

generally, Andreason v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 551, 558-59, 100
P.2d 202 (Utah 1940):
•

*

*

There must be a causal connection between his
employment, his place of employment, and his illness-something which happened to him in the performance of his
duties, or some contact he made at his place of
employment
while on duty there--which
forms
the
connecting
link
between
his
employment
and
the
contraction of the illness.
•

•

•

But in the present case, the contact with possible
carriers [of bacillus enteritidis] is all within the
24

employment.
The disease is uncommon and rare, it is
contracted from contact with diseased animals
Anderson had such contact at the company plant.
It
appears affirmatively that he did not have such a contact
at any other place. . . . [VI] e believe there is only one
reasonable inference to be drawn:
He contracted the
disease in the course of his employment.
(Emphasis added)
The totality of the evidence supports a finding that the
connection between the workplace and the seizures is much more than
coincidental.

The

facts

support

the

"natural

and

reasonable

inference" in human experience that the work factors were the
predominant or triggering cause of the seizures.
Issue #2.

The ALJ committed error in failing to deal

with the predisposition/aggravation

of a pre-existing

condition argument.
Did a unique combination of circumstances come together in
such a way as to make Mr. Thompson more susceptible to a seizure
and the exposure to chemicals in the workplace push him over the
edge?

Did nonwork-related factors "prime the pump" so that Mr.

Thompson's work in the workplace with the chemicals was just enough
to cause him a seizure?

See Giles v. Industrial Comm. , 692 P. 2d

743 (Utah 1984) .
The

ALJ

inference.

failed

to

consider

this

natural

Such was an abuse of discretion
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and

reasonable

A.
The

The ALJ Decision and Board Affirmance
ALJ,

the

IME,

and

especially

the

medical

panel

all

approached the case in an either/or, all or nothing, manner--the
cause of the seizures was either the previous head trauma or it was
the exposure to Chlorox, but not both.
In his Motion for Review, Mr. Thompson argued that the ALJ
decision failed to address Mr. Thompson's assertion that exposure
to disinfecting agents at work may very well have combined with his
pre-existing

sensitivity

to chemicals, thereby

compensable industrial injury.
Commission, again without

resulting

in a

In its decision, the Industrial

any analysis, decided

that

"While a

combination of non-industrial causes can, under some circumstances,
combine to produce a compensable injury, it is necessary for the
applicant to establish such circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Mr. Thompson has failed to do so in this case."

This was an incorrect conclusion.
such

circumstances

by

a

[R94]

Mr. Thompson did establish

preponderance

established all of his past brain trauma.

of

the

evidence.

He

He established all of

the space and time characteristics of the Seizures.

The ALJ, the

IME and the medical panel did not analyze the possibility of the
two general possible causes acting together, that is, of the idea
that Mr. Thompson's lack of a sense of smell and his history of a
few past instances of head trauma may have predisposed him to
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seizures and that exposure to chemicals in the workplace could have
pushed him "over the edge."
B.

Operative Statute, Regulation and Case Law

The law, however, is clear that if a workman, in the course of
his

work,

accidentally

sustains

an

injury,

the

injury

is

compensable even though such injury would not have occurred had not
the employee been predisposed to such an injury through some preexisting physical defect or condition.
existing

condition

must,

of

A claimant with a pre-

course, prove

a

later

injury

is

"medically" the result of an exertion or exposure that occurred
during a work-related activity and not solely the result of a preexisting condition.
In other words, a claimant with a pre-existing condition must
show

that

the employment

contributed

something

substantial

to

increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition.

Thus, situations that accelerate, aggravate or "light

up" pre-existing conditions and contribute to the subsequent onset
of symptoms of an injury or disease are compensable.
In cases involving exposure to chemical agents courts have
been willing to view such exposure as a triggering cause to lower
a person's dysfunction threshold already lowered by other factors.
Admittedly, these cases have analyzed the problem in the context of
occupational diseases.
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In Cain v. Guvton, 340 S.E.2d 501, 504-505 (N.C. App. 1986),
the

plaintiff

suffered

from

pre-existing

chronic

obstructive

pulmonary disease attributable to his smoking cigarettes, his prior
work for a prior employer in a setting which exposed him to cotton
dust,

and his employment

in a furniture

exposed to dangerous fumes.

The plaintiff then worked for a new

employer as a "battery buster."
disease.

factory where he was

He then developed a serious lung

Faced with the question of whether his work as a battery

buster aggravated his lung disease, the court held that an exposure
which proximately augmented the disease to any extent, however
slight,

would

development

qualify

of

compensation.

the

as

a

significant

disease

and

causal

entitle

factor

the

in

the

plaintiff

to

The administrative agency had held:

[B]ecause plaintiff's lungs were hyperactive and already
affected by cotton dust exposure, wood dust exposure, and
furniture glue fumes exposure, it is more likely that the
sulfuric acid fumes from the battery busting aggravated
and accelerated the lung disease . . .
The employer appealed, arguing insufficient proof of causation.
The reviewing court affirmed:
The doctor's testimony that the acid fumes are a
respiratory irritant, along with testimony that plaintiff
often inhaled those fumes, is sufficient to establish a
causal relationship with plaintiff's obstructive lung
disease.
Likewise, in Carawan v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 340 S.E.2d
506,

508-10

susceptibility

(N.C. App.
to an

1986),

insecticide
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the

plaintiff

which

the

had

a

employer

peculiar
regularly

sprayed in its building as part of routine building maintenance.
The employee eventually developed allergic contact dermatitis. The
employer asserted

that the conditions and causes which

led to

plaintiff's disability were not peculiar to a particular trade,
occupation or employment because the insecticide was used by the
plaintiff in her home and by the supermarket where she shopped.
(Plaintiff did not experience the same reaction at home or at the
supermarket where she shopped.)
The court disagreed and held that issue of whether a worker
has a greater exposure to a substance on the job than does the
public generally should be analyzed by whether it is because of the
nature of the substance itself and whether the concentrations of
the substance in the workplace may be greater than concentrations
to which the public generally is exposed.

Accordingly, the court

found the evidence revealed that plaintiff was exposed to a greater
concentration of the chemical than the general public because of
the frequency of exposure, the amount of exposure, and the constant
close physical proximity to the sprayed area:
The evidence permitted the Commission to find and
conclude that the form and quantity of her exposure to
chlorpyrifos caused her to contract a compensable
occupational disease.
The court also noted that a condition peculiar to the workplace
which accelerates the progress of an occupational disease to such

29

an extent that the disease finally causes the worker's incapacity
should be compensable.
See also Robinson v. Saif, 717 P.2d 1202, 1205-06
1986) , where

plaintiff

had

been

exposed

outside

(Or. App.

of

work

to

formaldehyde, phenol and hydrocarbons, and then began to work in a
furniture store where new furniture
was

uncrated

every

week.

The

(which gives off such fumes)

employee

began

to

experience

headaches, dizziness and fatigue:
The difficulty in this case is that claimant has
become
sensitized
to chemicals
that
are present
throughout the environment . . . In this case, we must
analyze the degree or quantum of exposure to the
offending chemicals on and off the job to determine
compensability.
When viewed as a cause of her
sensitivity, we find the claimant's exposure off the job
was not substantially the same as her exposure on the job
the evidence supports the finding that the
concentrations were significantly higher on the job.
. . . She experienced symptoms when working in the
showroom but found relief when working in the wellventilated warehouse or resting at home. These factors
support
the conclusion that work was the major
contributing cause of the disease.
This case presents conflicting medical evidence from
three doctors who specialize in allergies. . . . In the
absence of countervailing considerations, we accord more
weight to the opinions of the treating physicians. . . .
[A] claimant must prove that the conditions at work
were the major contributing cause of the disability.
. . . Although the specific chemical cause of claimant's
sensitivity is not conclusively established, she has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the major
contributing cause was her work environment at Struthers,
which exposed her to concentrations of chemicals much
greater than she was ordinarily exposed to outside the
course of employment. (Emphasis added)
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See also Jarrett v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 511
N.E.2d 144, 153-56
with

large

(111. App. 1987) in which an employee worked

blocks

containing

phenothiazine

agricultural industry to destroy worms).

(used

by

the

After several months of

exposure, he developed dizziness, headaches and then experienced a
seizure.

The evidence was that he had never experienced any of the

symptoms before, and had no history of seizure disorders.
The Commission found that claimant's condition of
ill-being was causally related to his exposure to the
hazards of an occupational disease; . . .
On April 8, 1986, on administrative review, the
trial court found that the Commission's decision was
against the manifest weight of the evidence because
claimant 'clearly failed to show any causal connection
between the alleged seizure activity and exposure to
phenothiazine while in the employ' of Staley.
On appeal, claimant contends that the trial court
erred in reversing the decision of the Commission because
it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
. . . A disease is deemed to have arisen out of the
employment if it is apparent to the rational mind, upon
consideration of all the circumstances, that a causal
connection exists between the conditions under which the
work is performed and the occupational disease.
Claimant's seizure disorder is an occupational disease
under the Act if his exposure to phenothiazine creates a
risk of contracting the disease which is greater than the
risk to the general public. . . .
The

court

connection

upheld

existed

the

between

Commission's
claimant's

seizure.
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finding
work

that

condition

a

causal

and

his

See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Grain Handling Co. v.
Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1939):

(discussing the issue in

the context of an occupational disease):
I can see no reason for limiting the protected class to
those who have a normal resistance to such diseases, or
for excluding those who are abnormally vulnerable.
See, generally, Tintic Milliner Co. v. Industrial Comm., 60
Utah

14,

206

P.278

(Utah

1922)

(inhalation

of

gas

in

the

workplace) ; Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 Utah Adv. Rep.
12 (Utah App. 1993).
C.

Application to this Case and Discussion
In this case, the ALJ, the IME and the medical panel did not

really

consider

together.

the

possible

combination

of

factors

working

Each looked at the problem as being one factor or the

other factor, not both interacting.

The ALJ, looking at it in an

all-or-nothing fashion, missed the big picture.
The ALJ's Order clearly reflects that the ALJ never really
considered the question of whether various factors, coming together
or acting together, served as a trigger to induce the seizures.
That, however, is probably the most logical scenario.
Peterson's

letter

of

September

3,

1993,

to

the

See Dr.
Worker's

Compensation Fund of Utah:
In his initial episode he presented confused,
soaking wet with recent amnesia and without trauma. It
was inferred from this that he probably had had a seizure
but that it had been possibly provoked by chasing animals
through a recently sprayed field or some other kind of
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exposure. As far as irritants that may have contributed
to that first episode, Dr. Halquist, the neurology
specialist who has consulted on the case, felt that
chlorine from using Chlorox in the standard way for
cleansing the cages that he uses in his truck, etc.,
could make a significant contribution towards setting off
an irritable focus.
The second episode was also on a day where he had
been using chlorine extensively and, again, it is felt to
be a contributing factor.
The patient had had at least one concussion prior to
his employment with D.C.A.C. and had one during an
encounter with a young bull when he was knocked flat and
hospitalized with multiple contusions. Dr. Halquist felt
that these probably were significant in establishing a
scarred
or
irritated
focus
later
exacerable
by
environmental exposure, fatigue, etc.
Hence, my hindsight would lend credence to the
scenario that Ivan's confirmed seizure disorder is
triggered into action by some of the chemical used in his
employment along with other usual trigger factors such as
fatigue, hunger, etc.
In

the

instant

case,

upon

consideration

of

all

the

circumstances, it "should be apparent to the rational mind" that a
causal

connection

exists

between

the

activities

required in the workplace and the seizures.
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or

exposures

Mr. Thompson suffered

seizures

during

the

workday

workplace chemicals.

soon

after

being

exposed

to

the

He had never suffered seizures before.

He

has not suffered them since.
It is a well-settled principle of Utah worker's compensation
case

law

that

compensation
doubt

should

if

there

is

any

doubt

respecting

right

to

(and in this case there will always be doubt), such
be

resolved

in

favor

of

the

injured

worker

and

recovery, not against the injured worker and against recovery.

M&K

Corp. v. Industrial Comm. , 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948) .
Issue #3 .

The ALJ committed error in denying all worker's

compensation benefits.
A.

The ALJ Decision and the Board Affirmance

As mentioned before, both Mr. Thompson's family doctor, Dr.
Peterson, and then the specialist who treated him, Dr. Hallquist,
both strongly suspected that his work activities, especially the
exposure to the chlorine diluted spray, had caused the seizures.
[R180]
The treating doctors acted on that basis and provided Mr.
Thompson with the medical care for which Mr. Thompson

is seeking

compensation.
The medical panel, who were asked the question of whether the
medical

treatment was reasonable and justified, concluded

that

"because of the circumstances in which the seizures occurred" (that
is, during work hours and immediately after performing the function
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of cleaning the kennel with the Chlorox spray and not at any other
time or after doing anything else) that the medical
reasonable and that "the medical care was justified."

care was
[R44-45]

Yet the ALJ denied all worker's compensation benefits.

[R70)

In his Motion for Review, Mr. Thompson argued the ALJ erred in
denying

all

decision,

workers'

the

compensation

Commission

benefits.

responded:

"In

[R73-95]

effect,

Mr.

In

its

Thompson

suggests that the ALJ should have awarded medical expenses to Mr.
Thompson, despite the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Thompson did not
suffer a compensable injury.
contention.

The Commission finds no merit to this

Medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act

are limited to payment for medical expenses necessary to care for
an industrial

injury.

Here, there was no industrial

injury."

[R94]
B.

Operative Statute, Regulation and Case Law

The Commission has the right and the power to make decisions
in disputed cases which would be in the interest of justice.
See generally Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979).
C.

Application to this Case and Discussion

If, as in this case, the treating physicians, the IME and the
medical panel concluded it was entirely necessary and reasonable to
provide an injured employee with medical care (indeed, DeAnn Hess,
Mr. Thompson's supervisor, ordered the ambulance after the second
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seizure, without obtaining Mr. Thompson's approval) and that Mr.
Thompson should continue to avoid contact with chemicals such as
Chlorox, and if the ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings, the
Commission should at least have considered ordering the carrier to
pay medical expenses even though it could have decided not to
require Mr. Thompson be paid any other compensation under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-45.
In other words, in light of the treating physicians' diagnoses
and treatment (and consequential medical expenses), and the medical
panel's conclusions, it would have been in the interest of justice
for the Commission to order the insurance carrier to pay such sums
as were necessary to treat the patient and the Commission's failure
to do so is an abdictation of the role as regulator of the Utah
workplace.
CONCLUSION CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
Mr.

Thompson's

testimony

as to the

facts of

exposure

to

chemicals in the workplace, his testimony as to the time and space
characteristics of the seizures, and the remarkable similarity in
the pattern of both seizures, along with the opinions of his
treating physicians, Dr. Peterson and Dr. Hallquist, is more than
sufficient to support a natural, reasonable, inference that there
is a rational connection between the workplace and the seizures, at
least to the extent of supporting payment of his medical expenses.
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The weight of medical evidence was consistent with recovery.

The ALJ should have so decided and his failure to do was an
abuse of discretion.

The Commission's affirmance was likewise an

abuse of discretion.

The ALJ was influenced to an extraordinary

and

improper degree by two issues raised by the

IME & medical

panel.
(1)

The previous instances of relatively minor head trauma

suffered by Mr. Thompson.
It is not disputed that years earlier Mr. Thompson had had a
slight concussion, and that several years before he hit his head on
a truck door .

But those experiences never resulted in seizures.

Why would they, suddenly, several years later, cause two seizures,
only a few weeks apart, in June & July, 1993, during work hours and
immediately after performing the same work duties?

Is it not a

natural or reasonable inference that those previous instances of
head trauma were not a cause or, if a cause, only a remote cause of
the

seizures?

That

is what

his treating physicians

[R131, R137, R153, R154, R164, R180]

concluded.

The ALJ and the Commission

should have reached the same conclusion.
(2)

That Mr. Thompson experienced no respiratory distress, or

other normal indicia of acute exposure, immediately prior to the
seizures.

[R47]
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It is not disputed that Mr. Thompson has no sense of smell.
There is little support in the record either for or against the
proposition that he did not experience any of the normal indicia of
acute chlorine exposure.

Mr. Thompson doesn't know what happened

seconds before the seizures.
the

Commission

should

have

Nobody will ever know.
given

weight

to

Mr.

The ALJ and
Thompson's

testimony, the treating physicians opinions, and the fundamental
similarity between the work conditions preceding the seizures.
Instead,

the ALJ and the Commission based a conclusion

on an

assumption that Mr. Thompson, who has no sense of smell, did not
experience
without

respiratory

any

support

difficulties.

one way

or the

Yet
other.

this

assumption

The ALJ

and

is
the

Commission thereby failed to exercise its discretion with respect
to Mr. Thompson and his predicament in a manner consistent with its
obligation.
Had the ALJ not made the errors he made in analyzing the
question of causation, he and the Commission would have reached a
much different conclusion.
The Court should resolve the doubts in this case in favor of
compensat ion.
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Dated this ^ / ^ d a y

of May, 1995
ROMNEY 8c CONDIE

ivid J. HeldsworthN
Attorney for Petitioner

ADDENDUM
(1)

Dr.

Peterson's

summary

statement

and

conclusion

to

and

conclusion

to

Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.
(2)

Dr. Hallquist's

summary

statement

Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.
(3)

The Agency Decision sought to be reviewed.

(4)

The Decision of the Board of Review.

(5)

Determinative sections from Workers Compensation

Statute.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This

is to certify

that

a true and correct

copy of

the

foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON APPEAL was placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, in Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of May, 1995, addressed to the following:
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

(^

cojffS

)

Ivan Thompson
857 West 1700 North
West Bountiful, Utah 84087
Erie V. Boorman
Employer's Reinsurance Fund
P. O. Box 146611
Salt Lake, City, UT 84114

%
/-?
A
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Mark Dean
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
P.O. Box 57929
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929
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415 SOUTH MEDICAL DRIVE
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3,

1993

BOUNTIFUL, UTAH WOIO
Telcnhone 292-7251

Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 57929
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157
Re:

Mr. Ivan Thompson
Davis County Animal Control

Gentlemen,
Mr. Thompson has called me and asked me to bring you up to date on
the development of his situation.
In his initial episode he presented confused, soaking wet with
recent amnesia and without trauma. It was inferred from this that
he probably had had a seizure but that it had been possibly
provoked by chasing animals through a recently sprayed field or
some other kind of exposure. As far as irritants that may have
contributed to that first episode, Dr. Holquist, the neurology
specialist who has consulted on the case, felt that chlorine from
using Chlorox in the standard way for cleansing the cages that he
uses in his truck, etc., could make a significant contribution
towards setting off an irritable focus.
The second episode was also on a day where he had been using
chlorine extensively and, again, it is felt to be a contributing
factor.
The patient had had at least one concussion prior to his employment
with D.C.A.C. and had one during an encounter with a young bull
when he was knocked flat and hospitalized with multiple contusions.
Dr. Holquist felt that these probably were significant in
establishing a scarred or irritated focus later exacerable by
environmental exposure, fatigue, etc.
Hence, my hindsight would lend credence to the scenario that Ivan's
confirmed seizure disorder is triggered into action by some of the
chemical used in his employments along with other usual trigger
factors such as fatigue, hunger, etc.
We have explained to him that he cannot drive and is not going to
be able to perform any of the major components of his previous
position for at least several months and have recommended that he
be retrained for other kinds of positions.
I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Sincer^Tyl

^.

Dennis R. Peterson, M.D.

Roberta R. Hallquist, MJ>«, ?X«
Board Certified In Adult Neurology

September 17, 1993

Mr* Rod Peterson, Adjuster
392 East 6400 South
P.O. Box 57929
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929
Re:

Ivan D, Thompson

Dear Mr. Peterson:
Mr. Ivan Thompson has been under my neurologic care since July 8,
1993. He suffered two generalized tonic-clonic seizures, posttraumatic variety, related to a remote concussion from a boxing
injury in his teens, and an indirect head trauma due to being
jarred or charged by a bull a year ago at work, plus occupational
exposure to chlorine, and other chemical exposure on the work
place. He has been maintained on anticonvulsant therapy with
Dilantin, and has had an abnormal EEG. The patient has not been
released for his usual work or light duty. His condition may be
permanent, but if he should remain seizure free for one two years
on anticonvulsant therapy and has a normal sleep deprived EEG,
there is a chance that he could come off anticonvulsant therapy,
although this would still give him as much as a ten percent
probability that his seizures might recur off anticonvulsant
therapy despite a normal sleep deprived EEG at two years seizurefree.
I think it is never going to be in his best interest to be
working in an environment where he is exposed to toxic chemicals.
In addition to this, he has had to undergo an otolaryngologic
evaluation for a possible neoplasm in his right frontal sinus
that requires surgical exploration and removal. He is unable to
drive and is to avoid heights, heavy or small machinery, tub
baths, and swimming.
Sincerely,

Roberta R. Hallqui
RRH/ch

425 Medical Drive • Suite 122 • Bountiful. Utah 84010 • (801)298-2609
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93-1036
IVAN D. THOMPSON,
Applicant,
FINDINGS OF FACT
vs,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DAVIS COUNTY and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
and/or EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE *
FUND OF UTAH,
*

AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on
February 2, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant, Ivan B. Thompson, was present and
represented by David A. Holdsworth,
Attorney at
Law.
The defendant employer, Davis County, and its
insurer, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney at Law.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at Law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This hearing was initially scheduled for December 12, 1993.
The applicant underwent surgery, and upon his request and the
concurrence of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), the
hearing was delayed until February 2, 1994.
The preliminary findings of fact, and the proposed questions
for the medical panel were sent to the parties on February 17, 1994
allowing them 15 days to make objections. The applicant proposed
some changes to the preliminary findings and instructions to the
medical panel, and where the requested changes were not
inconsistent with the facts as determined from the hearing, the
proposed changes were made. After receipt of the medical films and
X-rays, the case was referred to the medical panel on March 4,
1994, and the medical panel report was received by the Commission
on June 9, 1994.
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On June 9, 1994, the medical panel report was sent to the
parties with instructions to reply not later than the close-ofbusiness on June 24, 1994. Objections were received from the
applicant by fax on June 24, 1994. No objections were received
from the defendants.
The objections from the applicant to the medical panel report
have been reviewed.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.
The applicant, Ivan D. Thompson, at the time of the
alleged injuries on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993, was employed by
Davis County Animal Control.
2.
The applicant had the following work and educational
experiences: From 1981-83 he attended college; from 1983-85 he
served and completed a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints; in 1985 he returned home and thereafter in 198687 he worked for the California Protection Agency; in 1988-89 he
worked for Beehive Clothing as a preshrink material fabric
operator; in 199 0 he worked for Sysco Intermountain Foods, and in
1991 he went to work for Davis County as an animal control officer.
3. As an animal control officer, the applicant picked up
animals; answered emergency calls in relation to animals; helped
return livestock; sold animal licenses, and performed other related
duties.
4. In 1982 while attending college the applicant sustained a
head injury while boxing in a fund-raiser when he was knocked
"silly," and was hospitalized overnight. He was told by medical
personnel that he had suffered a concussion.
5. In 1988 the applicant suffered another concussion when he
was loading a washing machine into a pickup truck and hit his head
on the crest of the door. He went to the emergency room on the
same day.
6.

The applicant has no sense of smell (anosmia).

7.
After working for a short time as an animal control
officer prior to the alleged injuries related to the instant claim,
a large animal described as a bull, cow, or calf, depending on
which witness was testifying, knocked the applicant to the ground.
He experienced pain in his chest, and he was in the hospital
overnight.
8. Among the applicant's duties was the task to pick up
animals. Depending on the size of the animal, the applicant would
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place the critter into a kennel which was approximately the
following dimensions: one foot by one foot by one foot (which was
called a "cat" kennel) , or three feet by two feet and one half foot
by two and one half feet (dog kennel) , or a three feet by three
feet by four feet (large dog kennel) . The applicant would then
take the portable kennel, and place it in the bed of his pickup
truck which has a covered shell on the back of a pickup truck,
9.
The applicant would drive his pickup into the garage
facility which was described as "large enough to house a dump
truck.11 The applicant would take the portable kennel out of his
pickup truck, and place it on the floor of the garage.
If the
animal was a dog, the leash used to restrain the animal would be
dropped into a bucket containing Parvo disinfectant, a disinfectant
for parvovirus.
The last step in the process of handling the
animal would be for the applicant to spray the portable dog kennel
with a solution of Clorox and water. The Clorox was mixed to a
solution containing 30 parts of water to one part of Clorox. The
applicant described the Clorox as the same as that which can be
bought at any grocery store.
10. The clorox spray typically took from 3 0 seconds to one
minute per kennel and the applicant would have to spray anywhere
from two to six kennels per day. A typical day included only two
kennels.
11.
On June 1, 1993, the applicant cleaned his portable
kennel before going back into the field. He sprayed it with water,
used a scrub brush, and the Clorox water spray.
He got into his
truck, but does not remember anything after that. The applicant's
next recollection was when he saw his wife that afternoon.
He
experienced tongue pain at which time he went to his doctor. The
applicant was "soaking wet from the waist down," and had some green
vegetation resembling moss on his pants.
12. At that time the applicant was admitted to the hospital
and was kept there for three days. Thereafter he returned to work
on June 22, 1993.
13. On July 8, 1993, the applicant picked up a dog and then
cleaned his kennel with the water and clorox. He went home for
lunch.
The applicant next remembered that "the paramedics came
through the back door." He looked down and saw vomit on the floor.
He was placed in an ambulance, and was taken to Lakeview Hospital
in Bountiful.
14. The Parvicide is an antiviral agent used to kill a virus
(Parvo) which is exclusive to dogs.
15.

The Clorox solution was mixed by a maintenance worker and
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was contained in a portable weed sprayer. The kennels would be
sprayed in the garage, and would be left to air dry. The animal
control officer would then take a dry kennel, and put it into his
truck.
16. The sprayer was marked as to the correct amount of Clorox
which should be used in preparation of the clorox/water mixture.
17. The facilities were inspected regularly by the Humane
Society of Utah to insure that all substances in use would not be
injurious to animals, in the event the animals stood in the
liquids.
18. Other chemicals used by the animal control facilities,
but not by the other officers or the applicant, was Excidor, a
degreaser used by maintenance personnel. The degreaser was used to
remove grease excreted by dogs. Also previously used was Lemonfeet which was the officers to disinfect kennels prior to the use
of the clorox solution.
19. Mr. Thompson was under various stresses during the time
he was employed as an animal control officer. He had recently sold
his home; he was residing with in-laws; and, he was trying to refinance a home. The employer was also causing pressure on the
applicant for not producing or performing up to her standards. The
record indicates that the applicant was having trouble with his
license sales.
20. There was no evidence presented that Davis County sprayed
insect spray or other contaminants around the animal control
facility within several days prior to the applicant's industrial
incidents. The evidence shows that mosquito spray was not used
within the zone in which the applicant would have expected to be
working.
21.
The Weber County Crime Lab found no trace of any
poisonous chemicals on the pants that the applicant was wearing at
the time of admission to the hospital on July 8.
This
investigation was performed in response to an allegation that
perhaps the applicant had been poisoned by someone who was "out to
get him" for some unspecified reason.
22.
On June 22, 1993, the applicant was depressed and
withdrawn. He indicated that he was tired and ready to collapse.
23. The applicant was terminated on August 13, 1993, from his
position because the employer thought that he was "dishonest," and
had embellished many of his problems.
24.

No other employee has ever had any adverse reaction to
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the chemicals at the facility,
25.
Dr. Roberta Hallquist, a physician at the Lakeview
Hospital, determined over a period of time that the applicant had
experienced grand mal seizures as a result of the applicant's
exposure to the Clorox solution and other chemicals used at his
employment. Dr. Hallquist prescribed Dilantin for the applicant.
26.
Dr. Fumizuke Matsuo from the University of Utah
Department of Neurology evaluated the applicant and his medical
records and radiological study reports, but was not able to review
the applicant's original films. Dr. Matsuo concluded that "it does
not appear that Mr. Thompson" had suffered either acute or chronic
symptoms suggesting a toxic exposure." He was not sure if he had
any strong reasons to consider neuro-toxicity of sodium
hypochlorite as an explanation for the applicant's seizures,
although he indicated that it would appear prudent to manage Mr.
Thompson's seizure disorder as a condition of unknown etiology. He
further agreed with Dr. Hallquist's decision to place the applicant
on an anti-epileptic drug. Dr. Matsuo concluded that reevaluation
in one year was recommended and that the applicant could come off
phenytoin if Mr. Thompson remained without recurrent symptoms.
With regard to the contribution of the Clorox solution (sodium
hypochlorite) , he did not feel that there was any strong reason to
consider that solution as a toxic substance.
27. The medical panel consisted of Dr. Rawlins (toxicologist)
and Dr. Thomas (neurologist and chair). The panel met on May 17,
1994, reviewed the file and history, and examined the applicant as
well as discussed the applicant's problems with the applicant's
wife.
28.
The panel concluded in terms of reasonable medical
probability the following:
a.
There is not a medically demonstrable causal
connection between the applicant's 1 June 1993 and 8 July 1993
grand mal seizures and his work as an animal control officer in
Davis County during 1991 through 1993.
b.
The applicant's seizure problem consisted of two
highly probable grand mal seizures.
c.
The applicant did not have a nonwork-related
disability which was affected by his Davis County work.
d. The medical care which the applicant received since
1 June 1993 was not necessitated by exposure to chemicals while
working for Davis County during the relevant periods.
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e. There is no future medical care which can reasonably
be expected to be necessitated by the applicant's exposure.
f. The applicant does not appear to have any permanent
impairment except for the anosmia and the seizure disorder, both of
which are considered nonindustrial.
29. The judge adopts the findings of the medical panel as his
own,
DISCUSSION:
Counsel for the applicant has done a commendable job in
providing a thorough analysis as to why this case should be decided
in favor of the applicant. However, medical causation is lacking,
and the weight of the medical opinion is contrary to a finding of
medical causation.
The medical panel as well as Dr. Matsuo concluded that it was
unlikely that the exposure to the Clorox solution was sufficient to
cause any impact on the applicant's cerebral function. There were
none of the normal prodromes of significant respiratory distress
which ordinarily accompany even slight exposure to any Clorox type
spray.
Additionally, there was a significant delay in the
occurrence of a seizure after the last exposure.
During this
delay, the applicant was apparently able to function well which
suggested to the medical panel that there was no acute involvement.
In the absence of major noticeable respiratory distress, it is
not reasonable for there to be any continuing effects of the Clorox
type exposure on a cumulative basis. Also, there is no indication
that exposure to other agents including the detergent and the
Parvosol could have produced a convulsive seizure.
There are other clues unrelated to the applicant's work at
Davis County which predated his employment with Davis County and
are likely the causative factors. These are noted by the medical
panel to be:
a.
The likelihood of an injury which ruptured the
olfactory fibers as they came down through the lamina cribrosa
beneath the frontal lobes of the brain. The evidence shows that
the applicant's anosmia predated his work at Davis County.
b. There is history of an abnormal ventricle consistent
with an injury back in 1988. A localized EEG abnormality is
recorded which is not likely the result of a diffuse general toxic
agent.
c.

The applicant had a concussion in a boxing match
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while in college sufficient to require emergency room care, and
sufficient to require him to miss a period of school,
d. He hit his head on the door frame of his vehicle.
This was severe enough to cause him to obtain a CT scan at the
time.
e. His low blood sugar noted during one of his seizures
would not have occurred from exposure to the chemicals.
f. There is long standing evidence of asymmetry of the
lateral ventricles of the brain.
g. The suggestion that his anosmia might have allowed
him to have a greater exposure is negated by his intolerance to
even minimal exposures to gasoline, paint, or to the Clorox.
The applicant was exposed to small household and laundry type
concentrations of Clorox. There was no evidence that any other
members of the Davis County animal control section ever became ill
as a result of the exposures.
Under such circumstances, it has not been shown to a
preponderance that the seizures were medically caused by the work
at Davis County, and this case must therefore be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
There is insufficient evidence to show that Ivan D. Thompson's
grand mal seizures which occurred on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993
arose out of and in the course of exposure to Clorox and other
chemicals related to his employment for Davis County.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the claims of Ivan D. Thompson for
worker's compensation benefits based upon exposure to Clorox and
other chemicals used while employed by Davis County, allegedly
resulting in grand mal seizures on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993,
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the opposing parties shall have 15 days from the date
of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response
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with the Commission in accordance with U.CA. Section 63-46b-12(2).
DATED THIS J

day of July 1994.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISST©frp^UTAH
lamim A. Sims
Jminisxrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

#
I hereby certify that on the
-~) day of July 1994, the
attached ORDER in the case of Ivan D.""Thompson was mailed, postage
prepaid to the following persons at the following addresses:

Ivan Thompson
595 N 800 W
W Bountiful UT 84087

David J. Holdsworth, Atty
185 S State #500
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Mark Dean, Atty
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (Drop Box)
Erie V. Boorman, Atty
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
IVAN D. THOMPSON
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
DAVIS COUNTY and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants.

Case Nos. 93-1036
and 93-1037

Ivan D. Thompson seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's
Order which denied Mr. Thompson's claim for compensation under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
ALJ's decision.
In summary, Mr. Thompson worked as an animal
control officer for Davis County. His employment required that he
use various disinfecting agents to clean animal cages.
On June 1 and again on July 8, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced
grand mal seizures while at work. Dr. Hallquist, Mr. Thompson's
treating physician, attributed such seizures to Mr. Thompson's
exposure to the disinfecting agents used at his work. Dr. Matsuo,
from the University of Utah's Neurology Department, concluded that
Mr. Thompson's seizures were not caused by the disinfecting agents.
Due to the difference of medical opinion in this matter, the
ALJ appointed a medical panel which reviewed Mr. Thompson's records
and examining Mr. Thompson himself.
The panel found no causal
connection between Mr. Thompson's seizures and the disinfecting
agents used at his work.
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Based on the medical panel's report, the ALJ concluded Mr.
Thompson had failed to establish that his work caused his seizures.
The ALJ therefore denied Mr. Thompson's claim for workers'
compensation benefits.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires payment of
compensation and medical benefits to workers injured by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment.
It is the
obligation of the worker claiming such benefits to establish a
causal connection between work and injury. In this case, the ALJ
concluded Mr. Thompson had failed to prove a causal relationship
between his work and his injuries.
Mr. Thompson's Motion For Review alleges the ALJ required Mr.
Thompson to prove causation "to a certainty," thereby applying a
too-stringent standard of proof on Mr. Thompson.
However, the
Commission's review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ
applied the correct standard of proof, preponderance of the
evidence, to Mr. Thompson's claim.
Mr. Thompson also contends the ALJ's decision failed to
address Mr. Thompson's assertion that exposure to disinfecting
agents at work may have combined with his preexisting sensitivity
to chemicals, thereby resulting in a compensable industrial injury.
While a combination of nonindustrial and industrial causes can,
under some circumstances, combine to produce a compensable injury,
it is necessary for the applicant to establish such circumstances
by a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Thompson has failed to do
so in this case.
Finally, Mr. Thompson alleges the ALJ erred in denying all
workers' compensation benefits. In effect, Mr. Thompson suggests
that the ALJ should have awarded medical expenses to Mr. Thompson,
despite the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Thompson did not suffer a
compensable injury.
The Commission finds no merit to this
contention. Medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act
are limited to payment for medical expenses necessary to care for
an industrial injury. Here, there was no industrial injury.
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ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and dismisses
Mr. Thompson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this /^^JU

day of November-, JL994
Stephen' M«
Chairman

te//6to/^

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

/<<?
2 ^^g^S^^ ^

iff

Commissioner

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of Ivan D. Thompson, Case No.s 93-1036 and
93-1037, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, thisg?->J^day of
December, 1994, to the following:
DAVID J. HOLDSWORTH
ROMNEY & CONDIE
185 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 500
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
ERIE V. BOORMAN
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
P O BOX 146611
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
MARK DEAN
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
P 0 BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157-0929

A'dell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation.
1993

(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments
35-1-44. Definition o f terms.
shall commence within 30 days after any final
The following terms as used in this title shall be
award by the commission;
construed a s follows:
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the avment of this compensation with any stock corpoerage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules
ration or mutual association authorized to transprovided in Section 35-1-75.
act the business of workers' compensation insur(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
ance in this state, which payments shall comthe commission as to the amount of compensation
mence within 30 days after any final award by
due any injured, or the dependents of any dethe commission; or
ceased, employee.
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
benefits provided for in this title.
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically imwhen due as provided for in this title, which paypaired as to function. Disability can be total or
ments shall commence within 30 days after any
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or
final award by the commission. In these cases the
nonindustrial.
commission may in its discretion require the de(5) "General order" means an order applying
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to
generally throughout the state to all persons, emsecure the payment of compensation liabilities as
ployments, or places of employment of a class unthey are incurred, and may at any time change or
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if
orders of the commission shall be considered spein its judgment this action is necessary or desircial orders.
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition
all the provisions of law relating to the payment
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnorof compensation and the furnishing of medical,
mality or loss. Impairment may be either temponurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burrary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regulapendents of killed employees. The commission
tion, direction, requirement or standard of the
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privicommission, or any other determination arrived
lege as a self-insurer.
at, or decision made, by the commission.
(2)
The commission is authorized and empowered
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment" includes to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin
any injury caused by the willful act of a third any employer, within the provisions of this chapter,
person directed against an employee because from further operation of the employer's business,
where the employer has failed to provide for the payof his employment.
(b) The term does not include a disease, ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
except as the disease results from the injury. this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide,
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any em- the court shall enjoin the further operation of the
ployment or place of employment, means the employer's business until the payment of these benefreedom from danger to the life, health, or wel- fits has been secured by the employer as required by
fare of employees reasonably permitted by the this section. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission.
nature of the employment.
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and
moral well-being.
1991

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents
to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and t h e dependents of each such employee
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in t h e
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if t h e accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, a s provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on
the employee.
1988
35-1-46.

E m p l o y e r s to secure workers* c o m p e n -

sation benefits for employees —
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunction — Violation.
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns,
and school districts, shall secure the payment of
workers' compensation benefits for their employees:

(3) If the commission has reason to believe t h a t a n
employer of one or more employees is conducting a
business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section,
the commission m a y give such employer five days'
written notice by registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as
provided in this section and the court is empowered,
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunction restraining t h e further operation of t h e employer's business.
1989
35-1-46.10. Notice of n o n c o m p l i a n c e t o e m ployer — Enforcement p o w e r of commission — Penalty.

(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that
an employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of benefits in
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the
commission may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known
address of the employer.
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the commission may issue an order requiring the employer to
appear before the commission and show cause why
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benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined
by t h e commission, which may apportion the benefits
among the dependents in such manner as it deems
just and equitable Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be made, if the commission deems
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other
claims therefor The dependents, or persons to whom
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with
the finding and direction of the commission In all
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be
sufficient for the widow or widower to make application to the commission on behalf of that individual
and the minor children, and in cases where all of the
dependents are minors, the application shall be made
by the guardian or next friend of such minor dependents The commission may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a
method of safeguarding any payments due them
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die
during the period covered by such weekly payments,
the right of such dependent to compensation under
this title shall cease Should a surviving spouse, who
is a dependent of a deceased employee and who is
receiving the benefits of this title remarry, that individual's sole right after such remarriage, to further
payments of compensation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the balance of the weekly compensation payments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end of six years or 312 weeks from the
date of the injury from which death resulted, but in
no event shall such amount exceed 52 weeks of compensation at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse was receiving at the time of such remarriage If there are other dependents remaining at
the time of remarriage, benefits payable under this
title shall be paid to such person as the commission
may determine, for the use and benefit of the other
dependents, the weekly benefits to be paid at intervals of not less t h a n four weeks
1977
35-1-74.

Increase of award to children and dep e n d e n t s p o u s e — Effect of death,
marriage, majority, or termination of
d e p e n d e n c y of children — Death, divorce, or remarriage of spouse.
In all cases where an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent spouse or dependent
minor child or children, as provided in this title, such
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease
at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of eighteen years, or termination of dependency of such
minor child or children or upon the death, divorce or
remarriage of the spouse of the employee, subject to
those provisions relative to the remarriage of a
spouse as provided in Section 35-1-73
1979

35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of computation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the
average weekly wage of the injured employee at the
time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon
which to compute the weekly compensation rate and
shall be determined as tollows
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall
be that yearly wage divided by 52
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the month, the average weekly wage
shall be that monthly wage divided by 4 V3

(c) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the week, that amount shall be the average weekly wage
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the day, the weekly wage shall be determined by multiplying the daily wage by the
number of days and fraction of days in the week
during which the employee under a contract of
hire was working at the time of the accident, or
would have worked if the accident had not intervened In no case shall the daily wage be multiplied by less than three for the purpose of determining the weekly wage
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by
the number of hours the employee would have
worked for the week if the accident had not intervened In no case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining the weekly wage
(f) If at the time of the injury the hourly wage
has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the
wage for the purpose of calculating compensation
shall be the usual wage for similar services
where those services are rendered by paid employees
(g) (1) If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the output of the employee, the average weekly wage shall be the wage most
favorable to the employee computed by dividing by 13 the wages, not including overtime or premium pay, of the employee
earned through that employer in the first,
second, third, or fourth period of 13 consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the injury
(11) If the employee has been employed by
that employer less than 13 calendar weeks
immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be computed as under
Subsection (l)(g)(i), presuming the wages,
not including overtime or premium pay, to
be the amount he would have earned had he
been so employed for the full 13 calendar
weeks immediately preceding the injury and
had worked, when work was available to
other employees, in a similar occupation
(2) If none of the methods m Subsection (1) will
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a particular case, the commission shall use such other
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly
determine the employee's average weekly wage
(3) When the average weekly wage of the injured
employee at the time of the injury is determined as in
this section provided, it shall be taken as the basis
upon which to compute the weekly compensation
rate After the weekly compensation has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar
1994
35-1-76. Likelihood of increase to be considered.
If it is established that the injured employee was of
such age and experience when injured t h a t under
natural conditions his wages would be expected to
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving at
his average weekly wage
1953
35-1-77.

Medical panel — Medical director or
medical consultants — Discretionary
authority of c o m m i s s i o n to refer case
— Findings and reports — Objections
to report — Hearing — E x p e n s e s .

(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of

35-1-78

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

and in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability,
the commission may refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon
disability or death due to an occupational disease
is filed with the commission, the commission
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the
disease or condition involved in the claim
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an
impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission may
employ a medical director or medical consultants
on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose
of evaluating the medical evidence and advising
the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility If all parties agree to the
use of a medical director or medical consultants,
they shall be allowed to function in the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make such study, take
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the
commission, as it may determine to be necessary
or desirable
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may require In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of
the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel,
results from the occupational disease and
whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to
the disability or death, and if so, the extent in
percentage to which the other causes have so contributed
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute
full copies of the report to the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail
with return receipt requested Within 15 days
after the report is deposited in the United States
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission
written objections to the report If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence
(d) The commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical
panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the hearing for examination
and cross-examination For good cause shown,
the commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman or the medi-
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cal director or medical consultants, to be present
at the hearing for examination and cross-examination
(D The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is
sustained by the testimony admitted
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
1994
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission
to modify award — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award —
No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing The commission,
after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former findings and orders Records
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive
for ten years, other than cases of total permanent
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion
of the commission
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying m any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease
Act
(b) The commission has no power to change
the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (3)(a) in any respect
1994
35-1-79.

Lump-sum payments.

The commission, under special circumstances and
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute
periodical benefits to one or more lump-sum payments
1953

35-1-80. Compensation exempt from execution.
Compensation before payment shall be exempt
from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or
execution, and shall be paid only to employees or
their dependents
1953
35-1-81.

A w a r d s — Medical, nursing, hospital

and burial expenses — Artificial
means and appliances.
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this
chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital
services, for medicines, and for artificial means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or
the insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in
ordinary cases as established by rule
(3) If a compensable accident results in the breaking of or loss of an employee's artificial means or appliance including eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a replacement of the artificial means or appliance
(4) The commission may require the employer or
insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or
appliances or provide the employee with a replace-

